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VOLUME 25 1989/90 NUMBER 2 
TRUTH IN SENTENCING: ACCEPTING 
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Bradford C. Mank* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter Guidelines) al-
low federal district courts to reduce a defendant's sentence if the defend-
ant "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of per-
sonal responsibility for his criminal conduct .... "1 In United States v. 
Perez-Franco, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held that the above Guidelines section on acceptance of responsibility did 
not require a defendant to accept responsibility for charges that were to 
be dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 2 The Perez-Franco decision is 
an affront to the fundamental principle that a defendant ought to take 
personal responsibility for the crime that defendant actually committed if 
he or she desires mercy from the sentencing court. It may also encourage 
prosecutors to usurp the judicial function of determining which defend-
ants deserve a sentence reduction pursuant to the acceptance-of-responsi-
bility section.3 
* B.A. Harvard, 1983; J.D. Yale, 1987; Assistant Attorney General, State of Connecti-
cut. Any views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed 
to the Connecticut Attorney General's Office. 
1. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
3El.1(a) (West 1988) (hereinafter GUIDELINES). 
2. 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989). 
3. Professor Abraham Goldstein has argued that plea bargaining undermines the in-
tegrity of the judicial system where the parties distort the facts as a means to permit the 
defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge. See A. GOLDSTEIN. THE PASSIVE .JUDICIARY: 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND TilE GUILTY PLEA 44 (1981) ("The distorting effect of inac-
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The Perez-Franco court offered two primary grounds for its decision. 
First, the court interpreted the express language of the Guidelines per-
taining to acceptance of responsibility .. Second, the court observed that 
certain statements by the defendant about his or her conduct, beyond 
facts contained in the offense of conviction, might be used in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution5 and would violate the defendant's fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This violation would oc-
cur where the defendant was required to make inculpatory statements 
about conduct beyond that in the offense of conviction and these state-
ments were subsequently used against the defendant in a criminal trial.6 
This article will criticize the first ground in the Perez-Franco deci-
sion by providing an alternative interpretation of the language in the 
Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility section.7 In addition, this article 
will challenge the second ground in the decision by demonstrating that if 
a sentencing court requires a defendant to make self-incriminating state-
ments to receive a sentence reduction, then those statements are involun-
tary under the fifth amendment and cannot be used in a subsequent 
criminal trial. 8 
Judges should have the authority to determine whether a defendant 
1S repentant for the real offense he or she committed as opposed to a 
curate pleas is obvious. They make the world of crime and corrections a world of fictions. 
The criminal conviction becomes a suspect unit of analysis for counting crimes for sentenc-
ing, for making restitutionary awards, and for parole."); see also Mank, The Scope of Crimi-
nal Restitution: Awarding Unliquidated Damages in Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. U.L. 
REV. 55, 63-64 (1987) (inaccurate plea bargains make it more difficult for crime victims to 
recover restitution in a civil lawsuit). A number of scholars have argued that plea bargaining 
in the context of sentence guidelines may have the effect of transferring sentencing author-
ity from judges to prosecutors. See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial 
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. 
PA. L. REV. 550, 563-77 (1978); Alschuler & Schulhofer, Judicial Impressions of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENT. REP. 94, 94-99 (1989); Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentenc-
ing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 742-57 (1980). In Judicial Impressions of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, professors Schulhofer and Alschuler found, through a survey on the Sentencing 
Guidelines completed by thirty federal district judges, that the effect of the Guidelines was 
to transfer power from the judges to the prosecutors. The survey of the judges indicated 
that 83% of the judges believed that prosecutors had charge bargained under the Guidelines 
and had dismissed charges that probably could have been proven. Id. at 95. See generally 
infra notes 26, 53-65, 75-80 and accompanying text. 
4. 873 F.2d at 458-59. 
5. Id. at 459-61. 
6. Id. at 461-63. 
7. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text. 
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lesser crime negotiated in a plea bargain.9 Furthermore, judges should be 
able to ask a defendant about the real-offense behavior to curb potential 
prosecutorial abuses of discretion. 1o 
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Congress, through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, established 
the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter the Commis-
sion).ll The Commission was given the task of constructing sentencing 
guidelines to restrict the discretionary sentencing authority placed in 
judges by existing federal criminal statutes. The Act was the product of 
approximately fifteen years of scholarly debate during which most com-
mentators criticized indeterminate sentencing laws and the practice of al-
lowing judges broad sentencing discretion.12 The Commission, after two 
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see infra notes 53-65, 75-80 and accompa-
nying text. 
10. [d. 
11. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. II 1984), and other scattered sections). 
12. See Mank, Do the United States Sentencing Guidelines Deprive Defendants of 
Due Process?, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 377, 379-80 & nn. 12-14 (1987-1988) (discussing a number of 
books and articles from the 1970's and 1980's advocating sentencing reform). A number of 
commentators during the 1970's and early 1980's charged that indeterminate sentence stat-
utes and broad judicial sentencing discretion produced enormous sentence disparity-the 
sentencing of like cases differently. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITH-
OUT ORDER (1972); P. O'DONNEL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE 
SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); PANEL ON SENTENCING RE-
SEARCH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 
(1983). 
"It should be pointed out that these studies present evidence of possible sentence dis-
parities; at least some of the disparity can be justified on the ground that judges are making 
predictions about each individual's rehabilitation, and, therefore, that defendants who have 
committed the same crime may deserve different sentences." Mank, supra note 12, at 379 
n.12. Furthermore, the culpability of two criminals convicted of the same crime may be 
different. For example, one offender who committed first degree murder may have tortured 
her victim while another murderer killed his victim instantly. Additionally, in those jurisdic-
tions with parole systems or other forms of early release, a judge might give a long sentence 
with the expectation that the offender will serve a much shorter actual sentence. The nomi-
nal sentence given by a judge, therefore, may not be an accurate measure for comparing 
sentences and determining whether disparities exist among judges_ Still, from the evidence 
cited in the Frankel, O'Donnel, and Panel-on-Sentencing-Research studies, there are un-
doubtedly differences among judges in how they would sentence the same defendant. See 
Lowe, Modern Sentencing Reform: A Preliminary Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing 
Guidel(nes, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,9-12 (1987) for a discussion on the disparity issue and a 
survey of the literature on sentencing. 
Other scholars criticized indeterminate sentencing statutes and broad judicial discretion 
on the philosophical ground that sentences ought to be based on the seriousness of the 
offense committed-that is, on just deserts-rather than on rehabilitative grounds. See, e.g., 
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drafts and much public debate, produced the Guidelines which were ef-
fective on November 1, 1987. 13 On January 18, 1989, the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Mistretta held that the Commission 
and the Guidelines do not violate the separation of powers and nondele-
gation doctrines. H Lower federal courts have divided over whether the 
Guidelines violate due process principles; however, the recent trend 
among federal appellate courts has been to sustain the Guidelines against 
that constitutional challenge.15 
The Guidelines follow a numerical grid scheme. There are forty-three 
offense severity ratings, and an offender's criminal history is rated on a 
scale from one to six. Ie There are 258 sentence boxes contained in the 
grid and each box includes a sentence range that usually measures 
twenty-five percent from maximum to minimum.17 Judges retain com-
plete discretion in determining where an offender's sentence fits within 
the twenty-five percent sentence range, but must justify to a federal ap-
pellate court any "departure" from the range in the box. IS Each major 
crime category is assigned a base offense level on the forty-three point 
scale. For example, the Commission established a base level of seventeen 
points for a residential burglary.19 Points are added to the base offense 
depending upon such variables as the amount of money stolen, the type 
and quantity of illegal drug sold, or the degree of bodily injury to the 
victim.20 For instance, one point is added to the base of seventeen points 
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT (1976); Ozanne, Bringing the 
Rule of Law to Criminal Sentencing: Judicial Review, Sentencing Guidelines and a Policy 
of Just Deserts, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 721 (1982). 
13. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (1987). 
14. 109 S. Ct. E)47 (1989). 
15. See Mank, supra note 12 (discussing a number of federal district court decisions in 
which courts have divided over whether the guidelines violate due process principles; the 
article argues the guidelines provide enough discretion to meet due process standards). 
Since the article was published, a number of federal appellate courts have held that the 
guidelines do not violate due process guarantees. See, e.g., United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 
376 (1Ith Cir. 1989); United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 
1989); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Frank, 864 
F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989). In the Ninth Circuit, Judge 
Wiggins in a dissent from a decision invalidating the guidelines on other grounds expressed 
his view that the guidelines fulfill due process requirements. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 
857 F.2d 1245, 1269 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wiggins, J., dissenting), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989). 
16. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5A (sentencing table). . 
17. Id. 
18. See Mank, supra note 12, at 382-83, 391-93 (discussing the Guidelines' departure 
principles). For an in-depth discussion see Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements 
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459,459-76 (1988). 
19. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2B2.1. 
20. Id. passim. 
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for residential burglary if between $2,501 and $10,000 worth of property 
is taken or destroyed. A judge is authorized to add an additional two 
points if the offender possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon dur-
ing the course of the burglary.2! 
If an offender's total offense level is twenty points and the offender's 
criminal history places him or her within the second criminal history cat-
egory,22 then the Guidelines' sentencing table provides a range of thirty-
seven to forty-six months incarceration for this offender.23 
One of the most difficult issues that confronted the Commission was 
how to reconcile sentencing guidelines with the pervasive practice of plea 
bargaining. The overwhelming majority of convictions in federal courts, 
as well as most state courts, are the result of guilty pleas, and most of 
these are the product of negotiated plea bargains between the prosecutor 
and defense counsel.24 Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty as a re-
sult of a negotiated plea bargain receives a lighter sentence than a de-
fendant who is convicted after a jury trial. Moreover, judges tend to give 
a sentence reduction to those defendants who plead guilty even without a 
formal plea agreement with the government.211 
21. Id. §§ 2B2.l(b)(2)(B), 2B2.l(b)(3). 
22. Id. § 5A (sentencing table). 
23. Id. 
24. In the year ending June 30, 1986, approximately 75% of the defendants processed 
in the Second Circuit pleaded guilty. United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1145 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICs-1987 at 430, table 5.17 (1988». In the federal district 
courts, 81 % of the criminal convictions obtained in fiscal year 1982 were based on guilty 
pleas. Note, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and the Breach of Plea Agreements, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 142, 142 n.1 (1987); see also Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 
CALIF. L. REV. 652, 652 n.1 (1981) ("It is commonly estimated that 90% of all criminal con-
victions are the result of guilty pleas."). For a discussion of the pervasive role of plea bar-
gaining in the criminal justice system see id. In the year ending June 30, 1985, 33,823 con-
victions in United States district courts were the result of guilty pleas or pleas of nolo 
contendere, 87.8% of the total 38,530 convictions for that year. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 352, table 5.14. 
The United States Sentencing Commission has reported that 90.2% of the first 7,055 
defendants sentenced under the Guidelines pleaded guilty. Tonry. Are the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission's Guidelines "Working Well"?, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 122, 123, 125 & n.10 
(1989) (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT-1988 at 23 (1989)). 
25. See Alschuler, supra note 24, at 652·57 (most studies show that defendants who 
plea bargain receive lighter sentences, although a few studies found no significant sentence 
differential between guilty plea convictions and trial convictions, which suggests that some 
defendants may not have enough information to assess whether a plea bargain deal provides 
a less severe sentence than is likely to be received after a trial). In the past, before the 
advent of sentencing guidelines, judges had considerable discretion, and could limit the im-
pact of plea bargaining by sentencing based on the "real offense." See Schulhofer, supra 
note 3, at 743-48. In light of Professor Alschuler's review of the literature, it appears that 
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Plea bargaining presented a dilemma for the Commission. The prac-
tice of giving lighter sentences to defendants who plea bargain is at odds 
with the primary goal of the Guidelines, which is to reduce sentence dis-
parities among defendants who have committed similar crimes.26 On the 
other hand, eliminating plea bargaining altogether is probably unrealistic 
given the limited number of federal judges and judicial resources, al-
though a few commentators have disagreed.27 The United States Supreme 
Court in Santobello v. New York, stated that plea bargaining is "an es-
sential component of the administration of justice" because "[i]f every 
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and Federal 
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges 
and facilities."28 
The Commission apparently considered the issue of how the Guide-
lines should address plea bargaining carefully. The Chairman of the Com-
mission, Judge William W. Wilkins, even wrote a law review article on the 
subject. 29 Judge Wilkins stated in his article that the Commission consid-
ered and rejected the concept of giving a fixed-sentence discount to all 
defendants who entered guilty pleas. 30 Judga Wilkins noted that the 
Commission believed that this proposal was constitutionally viable in 
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Corbitt v. New 
Jersey.3! In Corbitt, the Court upheld a New Jersey homicide statute that 
mandated life imprisonment for a defendant convicted by a jury of first 
defendants usually, but not always, received a lighter sentence as a result of pleading guilty. 
Alschuler, supra note 24, at 652-fi7. 
26. See Alschuler • . ~upra note 18, at 459-76 (discussing the potential conflict between 
the goal of the guidelines to reduce disparities among defendants who have committed simi-
lar crimes and prosecutorial plea bargaining practices); see also supra note ;~ and accompa-
nying text. 
27. Professors Alschuler and Schulhofer have argued that the criminal justice system, 
with just a modest increase of resources, could provide a mini-trial before the court rather 
than a jury to every criminal defendant, and Alschuler in particular emphasizes that with a 
moderate increase in judicial resources a full jury trial could be provided in serious criminal 
cases to every criminal defendant. See Aischuler, Implementinp the Criminal Defendant's 
Ripht to Trial: AltematPues to the Plea Rargaining System, !i0 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); 
Schulhofer. Is Plea Rarpaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984). Regrettably, the 
Congress and various state legislatures have failed to provide the judicial resources neces-
sary to implement their proposals and to make plea bargaining less essential. 
28. 404 U.S. 2.')7, 260 (1971). 
29. See Wilkins. Plea Nepotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Of-
fender. and Departure.~: Policy Decisions in the Promulpation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181 (1988). 
:10. Id. at 190-91. 
:11. ld at 191 & n.65 (noting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978». 
1989-90J TRUTH IN SENTENCING 189 
degree murder, but also allowed for the possibility of a judge granting a 
lesser sentence for a defendant who entered a plea of non vult. 32 
As an alternative to granting fixed-sentence discounts to defendants 
who plead guilty, the Commission, in section 3El.l of the Guidelines, 
gave federal district courts the discretion to reduce a defendant's sen-
tence by two offense-levels on the forty-three point scale. Under section 
3El.l, a court may reduce the sentence "[iJf the defendant clearly dem-
onstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibil-
ity for his criminal conduct. "33 
The Commission was at pains to emphasize that "acceptance of re-
sponsibility" was not synonymous with entering a guilty plea. Section 
3El.l(b) of the Guidelines provides: "A defendant may be given consider-
ation under this section without regard to whether his conviction is based 
upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury or the practi-
cal certainty of conviction at trial."34 Section 3El.l(c) of the Guidelines 
provides: "A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sen-
tencing reduction under this section as a matter of right."3& In its official 
commentary to section 3El.l of the Guidelines, the Commission notes 
some circumstances unrelated to plea bargaining or guilty pleas that 
might indicate acceptance of responsibility. For example, the Commission 
observed that "voluntary surrender to authorities after commission of the 
offense" or "voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the 
fruits and instrumentalities of the offense" may be conduct worthy of a 
two-level sentence reduction.36 Despite the Commission's insistence that 
entering a guilty plea does not automatically entitle an offender to a 
lesser sentence, the "acceptance of responsibility" section of the Guide-
lines is likely to bel).efit primarily defendants who plead guilty. The Com-
mission clearly expected that result.37 
32. 439 U.S. at 216-17. In New Jersey at the time Corbitt was decided, guilty pleas 
were not allowed in murder cases, but a plea of non vult was allowed. ld at 215. A plea of 
non vult is equivalent to a plea of nolo contendere, or no contest. lri. 
33. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3El.l(a). 
34. [d. § 3ELl(b). 
35. [d. § 3ELl(c). 
36. ld. § 3ELl official commentary l(d), (e). 
37. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 471-72 (Commission intended that two-offense-
level reduction pursuant to acceptance-of-responsibility section would encourage guilty 
pleas). Two of the seven Commissioners on the United States Sentencing Commission have 
stated in law review articles that the Commission did not intend to cause significant changes 
in the practice of plea bargaining, and accordingly, it is clear that both Judges Wilkins and 
Breyer understood that the acceptance-of-responsibility section of the Guidelines would pri-
marily benefit defendants who plead guilty, the overwhelming majority. See Breyer, The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1988) ("The Guidelines seek to change existing plea bargaining prac-
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A major question concerning the Guidelines is whether federal prose-
cutors will attempt, through "charge bargaining," to offer bigger dis-
counts than those allowed under the Guidelines to induce defendants to 
plead guilty. Judge Wilkins, Chairman of the Commission, has defined 
charge. bargaining as follows: "Under charge bargaining, the parties only 
negotiate the charge or charges to which the defendant will plead guilty 
rather than the type or length of the sentence. The agreement is a general 
limitation on the potential maximum sentence to which the defendant 
will plead guilty rather than a specific recommendation of punishment. "38 
The two-offense-level reduction under the Guidelines' acceptance-of-re-
sponsibility section translates into about a twenty percent reduction for 
most defendants-"somewhat less than twenty percent at the highest of-
fense levels, substantially more at the lowest levels."39 The Commission's 
studies indicate that the Guidelines' twenty percent ~iscount is generally 
not as great as the sentence reductions given to most defendants who 
pleaded guilty in federal courts before the advent of the Guidelines!O 
Thus, the Guidelines, if strictly enforced, would reduce the sentence dis-
parities among defendants who plead guilty and those convicted after ex-
ercising their constitutional right to a jury trial. 
III. THE PEREZ-FRANCO DECISION 
The Perez-Franco case involved a rather typical charge-bargain 
agreement. The grand jury indicted Perez-Franco on five counts: Count I 
charged him with conspiracy to deliver heroin and possession with intent 
to distribute heroin; Count II charged him with delivery of heroin on Oc-
tober 16, 1987; Count III charged him with delivery of heroin on October 
26, 1987; Count IV charged him with possession with intent to distribute 
one kilogram or more of heroin; and Count V charged him with posses-
sion with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin.41 Perez-Franco 
entered into a charge-bargain agreement with the government under 
which he would plead guilty to Count IV in exchange for the government 
dismissing Counts I, II, and 111.42 In addition, the prosecutors agreed to 
tices only slightly .... With respect to both acceptance of responsibility and plea bargain-
ing, the Commission has basically left the problem, for the present. where it found it."); 
Wilkins, supra note 29, at 188 ("In the final analysis the Commission concluded that it 
would not suggest radical changes in the plea bargaining process in its initial guidelines. The 
potential for unanticipated problems that could undermine the effective administration of 
the system weighed heavily against a broad and sudden revamping of the plea negotiation 
process."). 
:~8. Wilkins, .~upra note 29, a~ 186. 
:~9. Alschuler, supra note 18. at 471. 
40. [d. 
41. United States v. Perez-Franco, 87:3 F.2d 41)5, 456 (lst Cir. 1989). 
42. [d. 
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recommend to the federal district court that it impose a sentence of ten 
years imprisonment, the statutory minimum, for Count IV.43 Count V had 
been dismissed prior to the plea agreement.H 
In many jurisdictions, including the federal courts, it is the usual 
practice to have a probation officer prepare a presentence report that ex-
amines the offense at issue and the offender's social background and per-
sonality.45 In their presentence reports, probation officers frequently in-
clude a suggested sentence or range that the sentencing court is free to 
disregard, but which may assist in making its determination.4a As part of 
the preparation for Perez-Franco's presentence report, a United States 
probation officer asked Perez-Franco to explain his involvement in the 
offense'" Perez-Franco ack'1owledged that he had possessed more than 
one kilogram of heroin with intent to distribute, the basis for Count IV, 
but declined to incriminate himself concerning the dismissed counts.48 
Because Perez-Franco refused to provide inculpatory information relating 
to the four dismissed counts, the probation officer in his presentence re-
port did not recommend that Perez-Franco receive a two point reduction 
pursuant to the Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility section,,9 
During Perez-Franco's sentencing hearing, the defense counsel and 
the government prosecutor urged the federal district court to grant the 
defendant the two point sentence reduction. The reduction was urged on 
the basis that Perez-Franco's acceptance of responsibility for the offense 
of conviction was sufficient under the Guidelines.50 The federal district 
court judge, Judge Pettine, rejected the arguments of both the defense 
and prosecution and ruled the Guidelines required a defendant to admit 
responsibility for "his total criminal conduct" to receive a two-offense-
level reduction:u Accordingly, the federal district court determined that 
it would not grant Perez-Franco a two-offense-Ievel reduction unless he 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See Note. A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in Presentence Investigation Reports. 
91 YALE L.J. 1225. 1226-28 (1982). 
46. Id. at 1228. 
47. Perez-Franco. 873 F.2d at 456-57. 
48. Id. at 457. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 457-59 & n.2. The government reversed its position on appeal to argue that 
the federal district court had the authority to refuse to grant a two-point reduction; the 
First Circuit approved of this reversal because "[b)y supporting the court below. the govern-
ment makes it easier for us to examine all aspects of this controversy." Id. at 458 n.2. 
51. Id. at 457-58. 
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admitted responsibility for the criminal conduct related to the dismissed 
counts.~2 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the 
district court's analysis of the Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility 
section, and held that a defendant need only admit his guilt concerning 
the offense of conviction. 
IV. REAL OR CONVICTION OFFENSE? 
At first glance, the First Circuit's determination that a district court 
can require a defendant to accept responsibility for only the offense of 
conviction may appear reasonable, and it may seem to make little differ-
ence whether defendants acknowledge responsibility for the real offense 
or conviction offense if the government has declined to prosecute them 
for criminal conduct beyond that contained in the conviction offense. 
There is ultimately, however, a great deal at stake concerning whether a 
defendant acknowledges responsibility for the real offense. At issue is 
whether judges or prosecutors will control sentencing, and whether prose-
cutors will subvert the Guidelines. 
A. Charge Bargaining 
It will be useful in understanding the Perez-Franco decision to 
make a distinction between "real-offense" and "conviction-offense" sen-
tencing. A common form of plea bargaining involves "charge bargain-
ing."~3 In a charge bargain, a prosecutor agrees not to charge a defendant 
with a more serious crime for which at least enough facts exist to secure 
an indictment or to support an information, or agrees to seek dismissal of 
an indictment or an information alleging a more serious crime, in ex-
change for a defendant's guilty plea to a lesser offense.54 In some cases 
there may be doubt about whether the government could obtain a convic-
tion on the more serious charge. In many instances there is substantial 
evidence that a defendant's real or actual offense behavior was signifi-
cantly more culpable than the conviction offense to which that defendant 
pleaded guilty.~~ Before the advent of sentencing guidelines, judges in 
both state and federal courts often sentenced a defendant based on the 
52. Id. 
53. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 474-75 (discussing charge bargaining); Wilkins, 
supra note 29, at 185-86 (same). 
54. Id. 
55. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 35-70 (discussing various cases in which the 
conviction offense was less serious than the real offense). 
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real-offense behavior, although the conviction offense established a statu-
tory limit on the maximum sentence. 56 
Charge bargaining presents a serious problem for sentencing within 
the Guidelines. The Guidelines' sentences for most crimes, with the nota-
ble exception of drug sentences which are based on the type and quantity 
of drug, are generally determined by the conviction offense rather than 
the real-offense behavior. 57 The Commission had originally experimented 
in its preliminary draft of September 1986 with a modified real-offense 
system of sentencing guidelines but later shifted to the less complex con-
viction-offense system.58 The Guidelines do provide a twenty-five percent 
sentence range for most crimes and also provide for sentence "depar-
tures" under the appropriate circumstances. However, the Guidelines' re-
strictions on judicial discretion in many cases would prevent a judge from 
imposing a sentence based on the real-offense behavior if the conviction 
offense is substantially less serious than the actual criminal conduct. 1I9 
Thus, charge bargaining can defeat the central goal of the Guide-
lines, which is to reduce disparities among criminals who have committed 
similar real crimes. In United States v. Fernandez, the Second Circuit 
noted Congress' concern that prosecutorial charge bargaining could un-
dermine the Guidelines: "Congress' concern regarding plea bargaining 
centered on prosecutors' discretion in charge bargaining, which it be-
lieved if left unchecked would undermine uniformity in sentencing."60 For 
example, absent any adjustments or departures, the Guidelines provide a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for first degree murder, but 
56. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 757-58 (before the advent of sentencing guide-
lines, evidence suggests that judges often took into account the real-offense behavior in de-
t;}rmining the final sentence). On the other hand, the evidence also suggests that defendants 
who pleaded guilty before the emergence of sentencing guidelines received lighter sentences. 
See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 652-57. This evidence is not necessarily contradictory; what 
it suggests is that in the era before sentence guidelines judges, not prosecutors, largely de-
termined the sentence discount granted to defendants who pleaded guilty. See Schul hofer, 
supra note 3, at 745-46 (discussing how judges by rejecting a small number of plea bargains 
can shape how prosecutors negotiate most plea bargains to fit judicial attitudes). 
57. See United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1988) (the Guidelines 
generally use a "charge-offense" approach, but treat certain offenses, including drug traffick-
ing crime~, on a "real-offense" basis). 
58. [d. Mr. Paul H. Robinson, one of the seven original Commissioners on the United 
States Sentencing Commission, has criticized the basic charge-offense nature of the Guide-
lines and proposed a more complex system of measuring the harmfulness of criminal con-
duct. See Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
59. The Guidelines primarily determine a sentence based on the charged offense 
rather than the real offense, except in the case of drug offenses, which are largely based on 
the real-offense conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (2d 
Cir. 1989); Breyer, supra note 37, at 8-12; see also Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245. 
60. United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1145 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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establish a sentence of about twelve years for second degree murder, 
which may be further reduced to ten years if the court determines that a 
defendant has accepted responsibility for the offense.6! Thus, charge bar-
gaining can undermine judicial authority unless district courts are per-
mitted by federal appellate courts to protect their sentencing authority 
by aggressively departing from the Guidelines' sentencing ranges when-
ever a prosecutor charges a defendant with an offense significantly less 
serious than the real-offense behavior.62 It remains to be seen to what 
extent federal appellate courts will permit such departures.63 
Furthermore, charge bargaining in the context of the Guidelines may 
have the effect of transferring power from judges to prosecutors because 
the Guidelines restrict the judicial discretion to impose a real-offense sen-
tence and thereby override an overly lenient plea bargain.6• There are 
several reasons why it may be undesirable to place primary sentencing 
authority in the hands of federal prosecutors: They are generally less ex-
perienced than federal district judges; their decisions are usually made in 
private with defense counsel and are less subject to scrutiny than the ac-
tions of federal district judges; and, obviously, they are partisan and sub-
ject to possible political pressures unlike federal district judges, who en-
joy life tenure.65 
B. The Language of the Guidelines 
The district court and First Circuit disagreed in the Perez-Franco 
case regarding whether the Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility sec-
tion requires a defendant to accept personal responsibility for merely the 
offense of conviction, as the First Circuit held, or for the real-offense be-
61. See GUIDELINES, supra note I, §§ 2A1.1- 2A1.4, 3E.1; Alschuler, supra note 18, at 
462. 
62. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 459-76. 
63. See generally id. (discussing in general the standards under which a district court 
may depart from the guidelines); Mank, supra note 12, at 382-83, 391-93 (discussing the 
Guidelines' departure principles). 
64. Congress recognized that prosecutorial charge bargaining might take the place of 
judicial discretion once the guidelines went into effect. See Fernar.,:ez, 877 F.2d at 1145. 
Professors Alschuler and Schulhofer have argued that sentencing guid ~lines tend to transfer 
power from judges to prosecutors. See Alschuler, supra note 3; Alschuler, supra note 18; 
Schulhofer, supra note 3. Professor Paul Robinson, a former Commissioner on the United 
States Sentencing Commission, has also noted the potential impact of prosecutorial plea 
bargaining on sentencing outcomes. Robinson, supra note 57, at 10 & n.37. Furthermore, 
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh has clearly recognized the potential for prosecutorial 
abuses under the Guidelines in light of his decision to issue instructions to federal prosecu-
tors placing limits on plea bargaining. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
65. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 754. 
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havior, as the district court held.66 The district court interpretation is 
more sound.6? The Commission had originally proposed requiring a de-
fendant to accept responsibility for the "offense of conviction," but in 
October 1987 amended the section so that a defendant had to accept re-
sponsibility for "his criminal conduct."68 The Commission made the fol-
lowing ambiguous comment regarding this amendment: "The purpose of 
this amendment is to clarify the guideline. "69 
The First Circuit in Perez-Franco argued that the Commission did 
not intend to require defendants to accept responsibility for their real-
offense behavior, but simply mandated that offenders acknowledge that 
they committed the offense of conviction: 
We find that the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be interpreted to 
mean what the government now urges. If a defendant's "criminal con-
duct" is interpreted to mean literally "all of his criminal c(\nduct," then 
not only does it include counts for which he was indicted and to which he 
has not pleaded guilty, but also must include criminal activity relating to 
the current offense for which he may not have been indicted, as well as 
any past criminal conduct. This reading could not possibly have been 
what the drafters intended. Nor can we accept the government's argu-
ment that "criminal conduct" means "all criminal conduct," while at the 
same time limiting "all criminal conduct" to mean only that included in 
the original indictment. The government has offered us no reason to 
adopt this particular interpretation-in our view, a strained one-of "all 
criminal conduct."7o 
The First 8ircuit's argument that exammmg all of a defendant's 
"criminal conduct" would require him or her to accept responsibility for 
"any past criminal conduct" is logical on its face, but the argument ap-
pears rather strained in light of traditional sentencing practices before 
the advent of sentence guidelines. Before guidelines, and currently in 
those states that have not y~t adopted sentence guidelines, it was com-
monplace for judges to factor in the real-offense behavior as part of the 
final sentence, although the offense of conviction set a statutory ceiling on 
the maximum sentence.7l Thus, it is quite possible that the Commission 
amended the acceptance-of-responsibility section in order to allow federal 
district courts their traditional authority to weigh an offender's real-of-
66. 873 F.2d at 458-59. 
67. Id. at 459. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. (emphasis in original). 
71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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fense behavior in determining whether that offender has truly accepted 
personal responsibility for a crime. 
The First Circuit in Perez-Franco offered another argument that ap-
pears less persuasive in light of traditional sentencing practices. The 
court maintained that the acceptance-of-responsibility section may have 
been amended because "the original 'offense of conviction' language was 
believed to be ambiguous, because on its face it implies the restrictive 
interpretation that a defendant actually had to be tried and convicted of 
an offense. Such a reading would incorrectly exclude guilty pleas, where 
no trial occurs. "72 
In view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of convictions in 
federal courts result from guilty pleas, the First Circuit's theory that the 
Commission believed that federal district judges would interpret the term 
"offense of conviction" to exclude guilty pleas is implausible. Especially 
so because the Commission intended to use the acceptance-of-responsibil-
ity section as a means to encourage guilty pleas.73 A literal interpretation 
of the Commission's amendment of the section from "offense of convic-
tion" to "his criminal conduct" supports the understanding that the 
Commission expanded the scope of what a defendant must acknowledge 
from the offense of conviction to the real offense. It also emphasizes the 
importance of the distinction between conviction-offense and real-offense 
sentencing in terms of allowing judges sufficient discretion to control 
prosecutorial charge bargaining." 
C. Real Offense Sentencing Versus Prosecutorial Discretion 
Judges should have the authority to question a defendant about the 
real-offense behavior as a means to determine whether a prosecutor's plea 
bargain is consistent with the public interest. In the leading case of 
72. 8n F.2d at 459 (emphasis in original). 
n. The overwhelming majority of convictions in federal courts are the products of 
guilty pleas. See supra note 24. The Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility section is pri-
marily aimed at encouraging defendants to plead guilty. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 
471-72. 
74. For a discussion of the distinction between real-offense and conviction-offense sen-
tencing see supra notes 53-56. When Congress created the Sentencing Commission in 1984, 
it directed the Commission to promulgate policy statements conr.erning the acceptance or 
rejection of plea agreements by federal judges. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 470 & n.43 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (Supp. II 1984)). The legislative history of this provision 
revealed Congressional concern that charge bargaining could undermine the guidelines_ Id. 
at 470. Thus, it is quite possible that the Commission amended the acceptance of responsi-
bility section with the intention of giving judges greater authority to consider real-offense 
facts as a means to limit the impact of plea bargaining. See generally id. at 470-76. 
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United States v. Ammidown,76 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit established the principle that a federal 
district court may refuse to dismiss a more serious indictment or allow a 
guilty plea to a lesser offense where the district court "finds that a prose-
cutor has failed to give consideration to factors that must be given con-
sideration in the public interest .... "76 The court of appeals did con-
clude, however, that the district court had abused its own discretion in 
refusing to accept a plea agreement in which the defendant was allowed 
to plead guilty to second degree murder instead of being prosecuted for 
first degree murder, in exchange for his testimony against an accomplice 
who actually committed the murder. In addition, pursuant to Rule 11(0 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. a federal district court must 
find "that there is a factual basis for the plea" before it may accept a 
defendant's guilty plea.77 A district court can generally rely upon the rep-
resentations of the prosecutor in determining the factual basis of a plea 
bargain and whether it is consistent with the public interest. Nonetheless, 
a district court should have the option of questioning the defendant 
about the real-offense behavior. This would assist the court in reviewing 
the actions of the prosecuting attorney to determine whether there has 
been an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 
Furthermore, allowing federal district courts to question defendants 
about their real-offense behavior will enhance the ability of courts to ful-
fill their duties under the Guidelines. Section 6B1.2(a) of the Guidelines 
mandates that a district court determine in the case of a plea bargain 
whether the "remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the 
actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not under-
mine the statutory purposes of sentencing." Moreover, section 6B1.4(a)(2) 
of the Guidelines provides that a plea agreement should "not contain 
misleading facts. "78 In order to fulfill these duties pursuant to sections 
6B1.2 and 6B1.4(a)(2), district courts need the authority to question de-
fendants about their real-offense behavior to ensure that the judiciary can 
act as an effective watchdog against potential prosecutorial abuses, how-
. is. 497 F.2d 61:; m.c. Cir. 19n). 
76. Id. at 617-18, 622; see also United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 
1975) (While courts generally should not disturb a prosecutor's discretion to terminate a 
case, there remains an "essential judicial function of protecting the public interest in the 
even handed administration of criminal justice .... "); see generally A. GOLDSTEIN. supra 
note :~. at 35-70 (discussing judicial authority to overrule prosecutorial decisions relating to 
plea bargainingl. 
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(0; .,ee A. GOLDSTEIN. supra note :3, at 38-41 (discussing Rule 
Il(f)). 
78. GUIDELINES, supra note I. §§ 681.2, 681.4(a)(2). 
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ever rare.79 By restricting the ability of district courts to question de-
fendants about their real-offense behavior, the Perez-Franco decision 
may have the effect of expanding prosecutorial power at the expense of 
the judiciary.80 
V. FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The First Circuit in Perez-Franco concluded that requiring a defend-
ant to accept responsibility for conduct beyond that in the offense of con-
viction would violate the privilege against self-incrimination under the 
fifth amendment because the elicited information might be used in a sub-
sequent trial against the defendant.8 ) To the contrary, the fifth amend-
ment's fundamental requirement that any statement used in a criminal 
prosecution be a voluntary expression of the defendant's free will would 
likely bar the use of this information in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion. The failure of the First Circuit in Perez-Franco to consider the issue 
of voluntariness casts serious doubt on its fifth amendment analysis. 
The Perez-Franco court emphasized that in some situations state-
ments made by a defendant during plea negotiations, or as the result of a 
completed plea bargain, may be used against that defendant in a subse-
quent criminal trial. This suggests that information elicited from a de-
fendant under the Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility section may 
be admissible in a future criminal trial,82 
The examples cited by the Perez-Franco court are of limited value 
though, because the court did not consider the issue of voluntariness. For 
79. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh has issued instructions to the United 
States Attorneys to prevent possible prosecutorial abuses of plea bargaining that might un-
dermine the Guidelines. These instructions require federal prosecutors to "openly iden-
tif[y)" any "departures from the guidelines," and discourage charge bargaining. United 
States Department of Justice, Plea Policy For Federal Prosecutors, 1 FED. SENT. REP. 421, 
421-23 (1989). Whether these instructions will be carried out in every case despite the 
case load pressures on federal prosecutors remains to be seen. At the 1989 annual meeting of 
the American Bar Association, Assistant United States Attorney Mark Bennett of Honolulu, 
Hawaii, noted that these restrictions on plea bargaining can be avoided in the pre-indict-
ment stage since Department of Justice regulations apply to the dismissal of charges that 
are already brought. Reports and Proposals, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2392, 2396 (Aug. 30, 
1989). Thus, plea bargaining negotiations and charge bargaining may well go on as before 
except that bargaining will begin at an earlier stage. Congress and the Commission may 
have wanted judges to assume the function of policing prosecutors to insure that plea bar-
gaining does not undermine the Guidelines. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see 
also supra text accompanying note 78. 
80. See The Old Days: When a Plea Was a Plea . .. , Nat'l L. J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 13, 
col. 4; see also supra notes 60-65, 74-79 and accompanying text. 
81. 873 F.2d at 459-63. 
82. [d. at 459-61. 
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example, the court notes that "unwithdrawn guilty pleas in a state court 
have been admitted for their evidentiary value in subsequent federal 
prosecutions involving the same event."83 The Perez-Franco court failed 
to observe that the admission of such information is not automatic, but 
rests upon a separate determination of whether the statement is volun-
tary. For instance, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United 
States v. Long,84 carefully considered whether the defendant's statements 
to state officials during negotiations for a prior state plea agreement were 
voluntary before holding that the federal district court properly admitted 
those statements in a subsequent federal criminal prosecution. "The co-
operative atmosphere and the fact that Long initiated negotiations mili-
tates against finding the situation here particularly coercive .... "85 
It will be useful at this juncture to consider under what circum-
stances a defendant's statement is voluntary pursuant to the standards of 
the fifth amendment. The United States Supreme Court has employed a 
"totality of all the surrounding circumstances" test for determining 
whether a statement is voluntary under the fifth amendment.86 An "im-
portant" factor in determining whether a statement is voluntary is 
whether the government has offered inducements to or made threats to 
the defendant as a means to obtain inculpatory information, although 
governmental inducements do not automatically render a statement 
involuntary.87 
This article will now examine under what circumstances statements 
made by a defendant in connection with the Guidelines' acceptance-of-
responsibility section are likely to be construed by courts as voluntary or 
involuntary. It should be noted that the totality of the circumstances test 
for determining voluntariness is necessarily somewhat subjective; how-
ever, there are many cases in which the voluntariness issue is relatively 
clear.88 If a defendant, in the era before the Guidelines, had made incrim-
83. [d. at 460. 
84. 852 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1988). 
85. [d. at 977. 
86. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (quoting Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). 
87. See Long, 852 F.2d at 977 (an "important" factor); see also Hutto v. Ross, 429 
U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (per curiam); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897); Gunsby 
v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979); People v. 
Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 721-50, 365 N.W.2d 648, 648-57 (1984). All these cases illustrate the 
proposition that government inducements may, in some circumstances, render a defendant's 
confession involuntary plJrsuant to the fifth amendment. 
88. In some close cases judges may disagree concerning whether a defendant's state-
ment is voluntary. See, e.g .. People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984) (four-to-
three decision). On the other hand, courts are likely to find a defendant's statement invol-
untary where the defendant. made the statement while in custody, unrepresented by counsel, 
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inating admissions to a probation officer or a court in the hope of demon-
strating contrition as a means to obtain a lighter sentence, it is likely that 
a court would have held that those admissions were voluntary because the 
defendant had initiated the discussion and the government had not made 
any inducements or threats to obtain the information.89 If a federal dis-
trict court today tells a defendant that he or she must admit to criminal 
conduct beyond that contained in the offense of conviction to obtain a 
two-offense-Ievel reduction pursuant to the Guidelines' acceptance-of-re-
sponsibility section, it is likely that a court would hold these admissions 
involuntary and therefore inadmissible in any subsequent criminal 
proceeding.90 
A distinction can be made between admissions made in specific re-
sponse to a sentencing court's request and statements made as part of a 
plea bargain. In plea bargains, defendants voluntarily waive their right to 
a jury trial in exchange for promises of leniency by the government.91 
While critics of plea bargaining often make the point that the government 
is usually in a superior bargaining position in comparison to the average 
criminal defendant, defendants do have the choice of either agreeing to a 
plea bargain or exercising their constitutional right to a jury trial.92 On 
the other hand, a sentencing court, even with the advent of the Guide-
lines, has considerable discretion in determining a defendant's sentence.93 
and after the government has made promises of leniency. Courts would rule this way be-
cause defendants who are unrepresented by counsel are deemed especially vulnerable to 
direct or implied promises no matter how slight the inducement is. See Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 374 (1988). 
89. See, e.g., Long, 852 F.2d at 977 (fact that defendant initiated negotiations is a 
significant facior in determining that a statement is voluntary). 
90. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
91. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
92. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (upholding a plea bargain despite 
the fact that the defendant entered a guilty plea only after the prosecutor threatened to 
indict him on a more serious charge carrying a mandatory life sentence). The Supreme 
Court declared that "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of 
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's 
offer." [d. at 363. See also United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1989) (uphold-
ing the Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility section against a sixth amendment chal-
lenge that the section, like plea bargaining, "chilled" the defendant's exercise of his right to 
jury trial). For a criticism of plea bargaining as inherently unfair and coercive, see Alschuler, 
supra note 24, at 661-69. For a defense of plea bargaining, see Church, In Defense of "Bar-
gain Justice," 13 L. & SOC'y REV. 509 (1979). 
93. Judges retain a fair amount of discretion under the Guidelines. See supra note 18 
and accompanying text. On the other hand, a prosecutor by charge bargaining a case can 
seriously intrude upon the sentencing judge's standard twenty-fivp. percent discretion, al-
though the judge does have the option of departing from the Guidelines' standard sentence 
range, but must convince a federal appellate court that the depar.ure is justified. See supra 
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A federal district court has complete autonomy in deciding whether a 
sentence belongs at the low or high end of the standard twenty-five per-
cent sentence range in the Guidelines, and may also depart from that 
range, although departures are subject to appellate review.9• Accordingly, 
if a court asks a defendant for information about a dismissed count and 
tells that defendant that his or her sentence will depend on his or her 
willingness to discuss conduct beyond that contained in the offense of 
conviction, a defendant is likely to feel compelled to answer. Thus, if Pe-
rez-Franco had responded to the district court's request for information 
about conduct relating to the dismissed counts, a future court would 
likely hold that his statements were involuntary and therefore inadmissi-
ble in any subsequent criminal trial against him.95 
note 18 and accompanying text. For example, a prosecutor might agree to allow a drug 
dealer to plead guilty to the offense of using a communication facility in committing a drug 
offense, which carries a base-offense level of twelve. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2D1.6. A 
court might believe that the real offense is selling 1 kilogram of heroin, which carries a base-
offense level of 32 and a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. § 2Dl.l. For a first offender, the 
sentence ranges for these two crimes are 10-16 months versus 121-151 months. Id. § 5A. 
Thus, while the sentencing court retains considerable discretion within the sentence range, a 
prosecutor can effectively usurp the sentencing function unless the court resorts to a sen-
tence departure. 
94. Id. 
95. This author has not found a case directly on point for the proposition that state-
ments made by a defendant as a direct result of a sentencing court's threat to impose a 
longer sentence are involuntary; however, there are a number of analogous cases in which 
courts have determined that a judge's participation in plea negotiations rendered a guilty 
plea involuntary. See, e.g., Porcaro v. United States, 784 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1986) (FED. R. 
CRIM. P. lI(e)(I) prohibits judicial involvement in plea negotiations), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
916 (1986); Smith v. United States, 670 F.2d 145, 147 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); United 
States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 834-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Werker, 535 
F.2d 198, 199-205 (2d Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976); United States ex 
rei. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 253-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) Uudicial involvement in 
plea negotiations raises substantial question of whether a guilty plea is involuntary); Ander-
son v. State, 263 Ind. 583, 335 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1975) Uudicial participation in plea negotia-
tions is highly suspect); In re Cox, 553 A.2d 1255, 1257 (Me. 1989) (Maine Supreme Court 
reprimands a trial judge for participating in plea negotiations); People v. Killebrew, 416 
Mich. 189, 330 N.W.2d 834 (1982) Uudical participation rendered defendant's guilty plea 
involuntary); State v. Pouncey, 29 Wn. App. 629, 637, 630 P.2d 932, 937 (1981) ("[Wle be-
lieve the appropriate appellate function is to scrutinize the available record carefully to de-
termine whether or not the judge's presence and/or involvement affected the voluntariness 
of the defendant's plea. See State v. Byrd, 63 Ohio St. 2d 288, 407 N.E.2d 1384 (1980)."). 
The Washington Appellate Court in the Pouncey case determined that the judicial involve-
ment had not been sufficient to render. the defendant's guilty plea involuntary. See gener-
ally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 20.2(c), 20.3(d) (1984); Annotation, 
Judge's Participation in Plea Bargaining Negotiations as Rendering Accused',; Guilty Plea 
Involuntary, 10 A.L.R. 4th 689 (1981 & Supp. 1989) (discussing a number of state and fed-
eral cases involving the issue of whether jt;dicial participation in plea negotiations rendered 
a guilty plea involuntary). While some states perrnit judicial involvement in plea negotia-
202 GONZAGA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 25:183 
The First Circuit's conclusion in Perez-Franco, that federal district 
courts may not ask defendants about their real-offense behavior beyond 
that contained in the offense of conviction in determining whether to 
grant a two-offense-Ievel reduction under the Guidelines because that in-
formation might be used against defendants in a subsequent criminal 
trial, is flawed as a result of the court's failure to consider whether those 
statements are voluntary pursuant to the fifth amendment. Those state-
ments would likely be inadmissible in any future criminal proceeding, and 
therefore the fifth amendment right not to give incriminating information 
tions, see Annotation, supra note ;)5, it is noteworthy that FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(1) ex-
pressly forbids such participation: "The court shall not participate in any such discussions." 
This suggests that federal courts are likely to examine carefully any judicial conduct that 
might render a guilty plea, and possibly a statement, involuntary. Obviously, the issue of 
whether judicial participation or inducements render a guilty plea involuntary is not exactly 
the same as whether a judge's demand for information from a defendant at a sentencing 
hearing concerning real-offense behavior beyond the conviction offense renders any state-
ments by the defendant involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. See generally 
Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 374 (1988) (dis-
cussing the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a statement is volun-
tary); supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. Still, it is noteworthy that courts have held 
that judicial threats of a longer sentence render a guilty plea involuntary. See, e.g., Barnes 
v. State, 70 Md. App. 694, 523 A.2d 635 (HJ87) (judge's threat of longer sentence if defend-
ant went to trial rendered guilty plea involuntary); State v. Benfield, 264 N.C. 75, 140 
S.E.2d 706 (l965) (same); State v. Byrd, 63 Ohio St. 2d 288, 294, 407 N.E.2d 1384, 1388-89 
(1980) ("The undisputed evidence in the case at bar shows that the judge's conduct in all 
probability led appellant to believe he could not get a fair trial. ... Any belief that a fair 
trial could not be had was strengthened by the judge's remarks regarding sentencing and the 
problems involved in having a jury trial." Thus, it is likely that judicial threats to give a 
defendant a longer sentence, by not awarding a two-offense-level reduction pursuant to the 
Guidelines' acceptance·of-responsibility section, unless the defendant confessed to conduct 
beyond that contained in the offense of conviction would render those statements involun-
tary because they are the product of judicial coercion. In Perez-Franco, there was also the 
issue of whether statements made by a defendant to a probation officer are admissible. 873 
F.2d at 456-63. Based on the above analysis, such statements would likely be involuntary if 
the sentencing court had established a policy of not granting a two-offense-level sentence 
reduction pursuant to the Guidelines to defendants who refused to provide information 
about the real-offense behavior to a probation officer. In that case, the probation officer 
would simply be acting as an agent of the court and the same arguments relating to the 
coercive power of sentencing judges would apply. Obviously, whether a defendant's state-
ment to a probation officer is voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances. See 
supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, section IB1.8(a) of the guidelines may provide an additional ground for ex-
cluding information elicited by a court seeking a defendant's acknowledgement of responsi-
bility for conduct heyond that contained in the offense of conviction. In United States v. 
Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253 (lOth Cir. 1989), the Tenth Circuit held that section IB1.8(a) of the 
Guidelines prevents informatiun that a guilty-pleading defendant provides to the govern-
ment under assurances it will not be used against her from being used by a judge during 
sentencing, unless the plea agreement explicitly says otherwise. The logical extension of this 
analysis is that such information can't be used by a judge in a later case. 
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against oneself does not bar judges from questioning offenders about real-
offense behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that federal district courts have the authority 
under the Guidelines to ask defendants to explain their real-offense be-
havior before deciding whether to grant a two-offense-level reduction pur-
suant to the acceptance-of-responsibility section. Federal district judges 
should protect the integrity of the Guidelines, which has the central goal 
of reducing sentence disparities among offenders who have committed the 
same real offense, by refusing to grant a sentence reduction pursuant to 
the acceptance-of-responsibility section, where the conviction offense 
does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the real criminal conduct. 
When the Commission wrote the Guidelines, it clearly intended that the 
maximum benefit for pleading guilty should be a two-offense-Ievel reduc-
tion pursuant to the acceptance-of-responsibility section and that judges 
should make that decision, not prosecutors.S6 Accordingly, federal district 
courts should be able to question defendants about their real-offense be-
havior to prevent prosecutors from subverting the Guidelines through 
charge bargaining.s7 
96. See supra notes 60-65; 74-80 and accompanying text. 
97. Id. 

